As geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) deepen, international headlines largely focus on legal or sovereignty claims, naval deployment, and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, one of the long-standing and overlooked dimensions of the maritime dispute circles not on militaries or legal arguments but on livelihoods: the condition of Filipino fishers in contested waters.
The Philippines–China maritime dispute, especially around Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Island after 2012 and the broader West Philippine Sea (WPS), has become symbolic of “gray zone” competition. But in the sea, this competition translates into a daily competition for survival for Filipino fishers, who largely depend on these waters for subsistence. The dispute raises intense questions about the limitations of international maritime law, the securitization of traditional livelihoods, and the shrinking civic space of non-state actors in maritime diplomacy.
Sovereignty or Survival: The Overlooked Stakeholders
Historically, fishing communities in the western part of Luzon in the Philippines—Pangasinan, Zambales, and Palawan—have fished in the waters surrounding Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal. These fishers have historically fished using wooden boats, with limited or no access to GPS or radio communications, making them one of the most vulnerable stakeholders within one of the most militarized and intensely contested waters and maritime zones.
As per the data from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) 2022, municipal (small) fisheries contribute around 26 percent of the Philippines’ total fish production, sustaining over 2.30 million registered fisherfolk. For thousands, access to rich fishing grounds in WPS is not merely economic—it is hereditary.
Despite this, since 2012, following China’s de facto control of Scarborough Shoal, Filipino fishers have increasingly reported intimidation, displacement, and loss of access. To prevent the entry of Philippine fishermen, Chinese maritime forces—ranging from coast guard vessels to maritime militia boats—have regularly used water cannons and blockades. In October 2023 alone, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) reported dozens of harassment incidents involving traditional fishermen near the shoal.
The Limits of Law: UNCLOS and PCA Ruling
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) claimant coastal states of the South China Sea were granted sovereign rights over natural resources within a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Similarly, in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China (PCA Case No. 2013-19) ruled for the Philippines and invalidated what China calls historical rights and the “nine-dash line,” affirming the traditional fishing rights of Filipino fishers at Scarborough Shoal.
Despite the 2016 ruling providing legal certainty, it has failed to generate concrete safeguards for the Filipino fishers. A non-participant in the PCA ruling of 2016, China rejected the verdict and continues to militarize the South China Sea. Despite legal legitimacy, fishers are powerless—confronted not just by stronger militia vessels but by a strategic calculus that treats them as collateral to broader national interests.
The PCA ruling recognized the traditional fishing rights and directed that these rights be respected even in disputed areas, but the enforcement of these rights remained unclear. Without proper enforcement or protective measures, the impact of the ruling has largely been symbolic at the community level.
Gray Zone Tactics and the Human Cost
China’s strategic use of gray zone tactics—coercive and non-kinetic actions designed to avoid direct confrontation—has particularly worse impacts on vulnerable actors. The deployment of maritime militias along with coast guards by China blurs the line between state and civilian, effectively creating a layered deterrence strategy.
For traditional fishers, these tactics impose major human insecurity, especially for fishers; China’s continued incursion in the West Philippine Sea results in loss of access, economic uncertainty, and psychological distress among fishers. An income dropping 70 percent is not uncommon, forcing fishers to either venture into more dangerous and deep waters or abandon their livelihood.
Furthermore, the militarization of the fisheries zone has turned subsistence acts into acts of defiance. In the absence of Philippine maritime authorities, fishers are left to weigh the risks themselves. In 2020, more than 1000 fishermen in Zambales and other provinces formed the Bigkis Fisherfolk Federation to defend their freedom of fishing near the shoal. As one of the fishermen in Masinloc, Philippines, recounted, “We were just trying to make a living, but we were driven out. Many of us dread seeing China’s coast guards.”
ASEAN, the Code of Conduct, and the Marginalization of Non-State Actors
Regional responses have failed to address this human security dimension. The long-awaited Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations between ASEAN and China had made little progress, often entangled in the vagueness of detailed provisions on fisheries and falling short of effective enforcement measures. More importantly, the COC processes have excluded the fishermen associations and local civil society, despite the severe impact they have endured.
The prevailing exclusionary tendency in maritime diplomacy, i.e., the marginalization of non-state actors in favor of state-centric negotiations. While naval diplomacy and strategic deterrence are still essential, they are not enough for comprehensive maritime governance. Without localized ideas and opinions and protection mechanisms, the COC risks becoming a performative document, detached from the on-the-ground realities of fishers dependent on the disputed waters for so long.
Policy Recommendations: Toward Inclusive Governance
The struggle of Filipino fishers raises profound questions of how we conceptualize maritime sovereignty. Sovereignty in its traditional sense translates into territorial control and exclusive rights. But for coastal communities, sovereignty is what gives them access, identity, and survival.
A shift in perspective is needed—one that frames maritime sovereignty as taking an approach aligned with indigenous and customary traditions across Southeast Asia, where the sea is not viewed as one’s property but as communal space requiring shared care and balance.
Such a framework would not contradict national interest but broaden to include those stakeholders whose lives are closely tied to the sea. The document also requires international legal regimes such as UNCLOS to evolve and recognize the traditional customary maritime practices, particularly in overlapping or disputed areas, to formally establish them.
The multifaceted risks facing traditional Filipino fishers in the West Philippine Sea should be addressed by the Philippine government by amending the fisheries code of 1998 and institutionalizing traditional fishing rights through legal recognition and enforcement.
Seeing increasing Chinese assertiveness, the Philippine government should strengthen the non-military patrolling capacity of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)—particularly in deep and high-risk fishing zones—providing rapid response.
At the same time, fisher cooperatives and maritime civil society must be integrated in negotiations, including the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct process, to raise the voices of local and important stakeholders.
Finally, a local monitoring platform should be developed to record the incidents of harassment, especially by Chinese vessels, bringing transparency and accountability to gray zone environments.
Conclusion: The Moral Arc of the Sea
The Philippines-China maritime dispute will likely persist as a central axis of Asia-Pacific geopolitics. But in the shadow of strategic competition lies a silent crisis—erosion of ancestral fishing rights that have shaped the maritime culture of the Philippines.
Traditional fishers may not be seen at the table of war games and diplomatic engagement, but they are the most affected, and preserving their rights is not a matter of law but of justice, heritage, and human dignity.
The South China Sea is not merely a strategic and resource-rich corridor but a lived space. As the region moves towards the rule-based maritime order, the lives and rights of those who have depended on its waters for centuries must be brought to the negotiation table.
